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This paper explores how the political support for Labour Market Regu-
lation (LMR) is agected by economic and political integration in a two-
country OLG model. We model LMR as wage regulation and analyse three
institutional settings: Autarchy, Economic Union and Political Union. In
Autarchy capital cannot ﬂow across borders and each country sets its most
preferred level of regulation. In the Economic Union capital markets are
integrated, while political decisions are not. In the Political Union a com-
mon level of LMR is set at a centralized level. In Autarchy, LMR may
endogenously arise if the economy is dynamically ecient. In this case,
despite the distortions generated in the labour market, LMR increases the
welfare of the young, because it raises their permanent income, their sav-
ings and the steady state capital stock. In the Economic Union, capital
outﬂows make the implementation of LMR more costly and provide in-
centives for each country to undercut the rival in order to attract capital.
Thus, a race-to-the-bottom takes place and the steady state level of LMR
decreases, harming the young individuals. The Political Union restores,
under symmetry, the autarchic outcome and welfare levels. The asymmet-
ric case is also analysed.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In recent years, the discussion on the egects of the so-called “global-
isation process” has raised a lot of interest and has involved a very broad
audience. Most of the attention has been devoted to the analysis of the
distributional consequences of deeper economic integration, the main con-
cern being that tighter economic links may restrict domestic choices on
social policies. On these grounds, in June 1992, the Danes rejected the
Maastricht treaty and the French came very close to doing the same. In
both countries there was a widespread fear that economic integration might
undermine the labour and social standards implemented since then.
Surprisingly enough, despite the vast echo raised by these events, very
little economic research has been conducted thereafter to rigorously sort
out the reasons of the opposition to economic integration and to identify
the winners and the losers of the globalisation process. Economists mostly
addressed the issue in an informal way, failing to take into account two key
features, namely () that economically integrated countries strategically
interact among each other and () that policies are endogenous.
In particular, this paper analyses how capital markets integration af-
fects the incentives to regulate the labour market, distinguishing three dif-
ferent institutional arrangements: Autarchy, Economic Union and Political
Union. Autarchy is a setting in which capital does not ﬂow across borders
and each country sets its most preferred level of labour market regula-
tion. The Economic Union is characterised by integrated capital markets
in which countries compete. In the Political Union a common level of LMR
is set at a centralised level.
We work within an overlapping generation model where individuals
work when young and are retired when old. As a consequence, the factor-
structure of agents’ income sources changes over time. When young, indi-
viduals earn from labour income; when old, they earn from capital income.
We model Labour Market Regulation (LMR) as wage regulation and main-
tain the assumption that the wage rate is set through a political process
where both workers (the young) and capitalists (the old) may intervene
through lobbying activities, whose egectiveness depend on the (exogenous)
political power of each group. Capitalists are always against LMR, becauseit decreases the interest rate. Workers face a trade-og. On the one hand,
they support LMR because it increases their labour income. On the other
hand they anticipate that high LMR will harm them in the second period
of their lives. The paper discusses how this trade-og is agected by capital
markets integration and by political integration.
1. Autarchy. We ﬁrst analyse the benchmark case of Autarchy. In
order to understand what are the incentives to regulate the labour market,
notice that, since LMR raises the labour income and decreases the interest
rate, it transfers resources over time. However, agents have also available
the standard tool to intertemporally transfer resources, namely the market.
Thus, the young support the implementation of a regulated wage, only if it
transfers resources at better terms than those ogered by the market. The
condition for this to happen is that the economy is dynamically ecient, i.e.
there is no over-accumulation of capital and therefore the interest rate is not
too low. To understand why, observe that giving up one unit of resources
in the second period allows agents to get 1
1+ units in the ﬁrst period, when
using the market. Therefore, the higher the interest rate, the less they
get and the more likely that wage regulation ogers more convenient terms.
Under dynamic eciency, and if the output loss generated by LMR is not
too large,1LMR arises in steady state and raises the capital stock. The
latter ege c tt a k e sp l a c eb e c a u s et h er i s eo ft h ei n c o m eo ft h ey o u n gf o s t e r s
savings.2
2. Economic Union. In this context agents are allowed to invest sav-
ings both in their home country and abroad, and each country sets its most
preferred level of LMR taking into account that the rival replies optimally.
In the case of perfect capital mobility and symmetry, each country has the
incentive to slightly undercut the rival’s wage and get all the capital. Thus,
no LMR arises in steady state. The general lesson is that, in this setting,
() LMR is more costly because it reduces the current capital stock either
through larger capital outﬂows or through smaller capital inﬂows and ()
strategic interaction further decreases the incentives to regulate the labour
market because each country tries to undercut the rival. Therefore there
is less LMR in steady state.
3. Political Union. In the symmetric case the Political Union triv-
ially restores the Autarchic outcome, because policy centralisation avoids
competition for capital. In the asymmetric case, the outcome lies between
the autarchic ones and depends on the relative political power of the coun-
tries inside the union.
As a ﬁnal step, the paper ranks the three institutional settings ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h ebehind the veil of ignorance welfare criterion. It ﬁnds that,
under symmetry, Autarchy and Political Union deliver a higher welfare
compared to the Economic Union where a lower level of LMR is imple-
mented. The reason is that LMR allows, under dynamic eciency, to raise
workers’ permanent income because it transfers resources over time at bet-
ter terms than the market. The analysis of the asymmetric case, along
with a number of caveats on the welfare analysis, is also presented.
To conclude, ﬁrst the paper sheds new light on the political economy of
labour market regulation in the context of overlapping generation models
and highlights the unexplored link between LMR and dynamic eciency.
Moreover, it shows that globalisation (i.e. strategic interaction in an open
economy setting) may reduce the support for labour regulation and this,
surprisingly enough, may not be welfare enhancing, despite the lower level
of distortions.1 INTRODUCTION1
Economic theory suggests that economic integration generates welfare gains.
Gains from trade are the most obvious source. Further beneﬁts stem from
increased labour and capital mobility that put pressure on uncompetitive
labour market practices, reduce rigidities and lead to a more ecient allo-
cation of resources. Still, we do observe political opposition to the process
of economic integration, in most cases due to the fear that it may agect
countries labour and social standards.2 In recent years, economic discus-
sions and political agendas have been increasingly focusing on the egects
of the so-called “globalisation” process on the welfare state and on redis-
tributive policies.3 One interesting and most debated issue, addressed in
this paper, concerns the distributional egects of economic integration tak-
ing place through labour market institutions. In other words, we analyse
the distributional egects of changes in labour market regulation that (en-
dogenously) follow from increased economic integration. The literature on
the political economy of labour market institutions, dating back to Wright
(1986), has, to my knowledge, overlooked this issue. Moreover, this lit-
erature has failed to formally take into account that, in an economically
integrated environment, countries strategically interact among each other
when setting national policies. This paper aims at ﬁlling these gaps and
analyses the egects of capital market integration in a world where Labour
Market Regulation (LMR) is endogenous, agents are heterogenous, and
countries compete for capital.
We set up a two-country standard OLG model where the young own
no assets and work, and the old are retired and live og their savings.
We explore three institutional settings: Autarchy, Economic Union and
Political Union. In Autarchy capital does not ﬂow across borders and each
country implements its most preferred level of regulation. In the Economic
Union capital markets are integrated, while political decisions are not. In
the Political Union a common level of LMR is set at a centralised level.
In the model, we compress LMR to one dimension and assume that the
policy variable is the wage rate, that may therefore diger from the market
clearing level.4 Whenever this is the case, we assume, for simplicity, work-
sharing.
In the model, LMR is set through a political process where both work-
ers (the young) and capitalists (the old) may intervene through lobbying
activities. Since the factor-structure of agents’ income sources changes
over time, the same happens to the agents’ preferences over LMR.5 The
old never support LMR, because it reduces the rate of return of capital.
The young face a trade-og. They favor it because it raises labour income,
but they anticipate that they will dislike it in the second period.
We ﬁrst analyse Autarchy and show that in a closed economy LMR
may endogenously arise in steady state. A necessary condition for this is
that the economy is dynamically ecient.6 To understand the intuition,
observe that, under dynamic eciency, the young would endorse the im-
plementation of the reverse of a social security scheme that, in each period,
transfers resources from the old to the young. The young and all future
generations are made better og by such a scheme because it raises their
permanent income by shifting resources from the second to the ﬁrst period
at better terms than those ogered by the market (1  1(1 + )). Ab-
sent non-distortionary tools, the young may mimic them using LMR that,
de facto, transfers resources over time because it raises the labour income
and it decreases the interest rate. However, also for LMR to provide better
terms than the market the economy must be dynamically ecient, because
the interest rate must be high enough.
The introduction of LMR also introduces distortions in the labour
market. Thus, a further necessary condition to have it in steady state
is that the output losses due to labour market distortions are not too
large. To parameterise their size , we assume that, when not working
in the ﬁrm, workers may produce the same good by means of a constant
returns technology in labour. The production losses generated by LMR are
smaller the higher the productivity of the backyard technology.7 Summing
up, LMR arises in Autarchy if () the economy is dynamically ecient, ()
the productivity of the backyard technology is high enough, and ()t h e
young have enough political power.
Notice that, digerently from the previous literature on endogenous
labour market institutions, LMR arises in steady state neither because of
2rent-seeking behaviour, nor because it provides insurance against labour
market risk. Rather, because it shifts resources over time in a way that is
unfeasible to the market, thus raising the permanent income of the young.
This, in turn, props up savings,8 fosters capital accumulation and leads to
a larger steady state capital stock.9
In the symmetric two-country setting with integrated capital markets
and no labour mobility, dubbed as Economic Union, countries have incen-
tives to undercut the foreign country wage in order to attract capital. The
more capital markets are integrated, i.e. the lower the cost of investing
abroad, the more costly the implementation of LMR and the larger the
returns from undercutting the rival. A standard race-to-the-bottom takes
place and steady state wages are lower than in Autarchy.
In the Political Union, on top of economic integration, there is also
political integration. Thus, in the symmetric case, the Political Union triv-
ially restores the Autarchic outcome, because policy centralisation prevents
competition for capital to take place.
When it comes to comparing the three environments, since we focus
on steady states, it seems reasonable to adopt the point of view of a young
person, and wonder in which setting she would prefer to spend her whole
lifetime. In this OLG context, this is equivalent to the adoption of the
behind the veil of ignorance welfare criterion.
In the symmetric case, whenever LMR would arise in the autarchic
steady state, the young prefer to live in Autarchy or in the Political Union,
because in the Economic Union competition for capital prevents LMR to be
implemented. The welfare of the young is higher in the settings where there
are larger distortions, because the welfare losses caused by the productive
inec i e n c i e sa r eo u t w e i g h e db yt h er i s ei nt h ep e r m a n e n ti n c o m ea n di n
the capital stock generated by LMR.
We also analyse the case where countries are asymmetric. In the Eco-
nomic Union steady state, the country in which the support for regulation
is stronger sets a higher wage. Therefore, it sugers from capital outﬂows. If
the degree of asymmetry between countries is low enough, Political Union
and Autarchy still generate a higher steady state welfare, relative to the
Economic Union, in both countries. This happens because capital ﬂows
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are relatively small. Thus, both countries - even the one that enjoys cap-
ital inﬂows - are better og if they get rid of the race-to-the-bottom egect
triggered by capital competition.
As the degree of asymmetry becomes substantial capital ﬂows become
relevant. In this case the recipient country is better og in the Economic
Union steady state because of the large capital inﬂows. In contrast, the
more regulated country is always better og in the Autarchic steady state,
and it will typically prefer the Political to the Economic Union, because it
prevents capital outﬂows.
This paper belongs to the literature on the political economy of labour
market institutions. Typically, this literature speciﬁes models where the
decisive voter is an employed agent who enjoys labour market rents due
to microeconomic frictions that generate downward wage rigidity.10 Thus,
labour market rigidities arise in political equilibria, reduce the aggregate
surplus and, under risk neutrality, decrease aggregate welfare. However,
labour market regulation has also been shown to arise as a second-best
option, under ﬁnancial market imperfections,11 since it may provide risk-
averse workers with insurance against labour market risks that laissez-faire
arrangements may be unable to supply. In this paper, LMR arises because
it allows to shift resources over time at better terms than those provided
by the market, and improves the welfare of the current and future young
generations by increasing their permanent income, their savings and the
steady state capital stock.
We also relate to papers that analyse how wages are agected by eco-
nomic integration when countries strategically interact and labour markets
are unionised.12 In a static context, Naylor (1998) explores the egect of
trade, Zhao (1995) the egects of FDI and Danthine and Hunt (1994) the
egects of the reduction of the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining
due to deeper economic integration.13
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fundamen-
tals of the model economy. Section 3 analyses Autarchy and characterises
the autarchic economic equilibrium (subsection 3.1), the autarchic politico-
economic equilibrium and the autarchic steady state (subsection 3.2). Sec-
tion 4 and 5 explore the Economic Union and the Political Union. Section
46 discusses welfare and section 7 concludes.
2T H E M O D E L
We consider two countries, the home country and the foreign country, and
analyse their interaction within an overlapping generations model. We ﬁrst
describe the production technologies and the assumptions concerning the
labour market (subsection 2.1). We then turn to the household behaviour
(subsection 2.2). We refer to the domestic country, the description of the
foreign country being completely analogous.
2.1 Production and labour market
A single good  is produced in each country through a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology that makes use of labour  and capital . The (net) production
function is
 = 1  
where  5 [0	1] is the depreciation rate of capital. There is free entry in
the market and ﬁrms take prices as given. The ﬁrms’ demands for labour


















 and  denoting the wage and the interest rate.
The total mass of workers equals 1 and each worker inelastically sup-
plies 1 unit of labour, so that   1 . T h ew a g ei sn o td e t e r m i n e di n
a competitive fashion. It is set in the political arena in a way speciﬁed
in section 3.2. If the regulated wage lies above the competitive level, the
labour market does not clear, employment is determined by the labour
demand, and there is under-employment. In this case, for simplicity, we
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assume work-sharing, i.e. each worker reduces her work-time. If the regu-
lated wage lies below the competitive level, competition among producers
drives it up to the competitive level. Hence, the regulated wage acts as a
wage ﬂoor.14
A second crucial assumption is that workers are provided with a home
production technology that allows them to produce  using a constant
returns technology in labour. We denote by  the productivity of labour
in such a backyard technology.15
The equilibrium in the labour market is characterised as follows. Sup-
pose that 







denotes the minimum level of capital such that the labour mar-
k e tc l e a r sa tt h ew a g e
, i.e. b  (
) is such that  (	
) = 1, for all
  b  (
). Then, the labour market is characterised by one of the two
following regimes.
1. The capital stock is large enough, namely   b  (
). In this case,
the labour market clears, i.e.  (	
) = 1, and the labour income
is given by the competitive wage 
()=( 1 ).F r o m( 2 ) ,t h e
interest rate is  ()=1  . Nobody makes use of the home
production technology, since   
  
().
2. The capital stock is low enough, namely b  (
). In this case, the
regulated wage is larger than the competitive market-clearing wage,
i.e. 

 () ,a n de m p l o y m e n ti sp i n n e dd o w nb yt h el a b o u r
demand  (	
).
We call the latter regime the under-employment regime. In this regime
each worker works  (	
) units of time in the ﬁrm, and 1   (	
)















6Notice that, taking capital as given, total labour income is increasing in
the regulated wage 
, if the latter does not exceed the threshold 
1,w h i c h






















Using (1) and (2), and imposing the zero proﬁt condition, the interest rate










The interest rate is decreasing in the wage rate. Given the demand for
capital and labour, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts only if the no arbitrage condition
(5) holds.
2.2 Households
Agents live two periods. We assume no population growth. In period ,
the young work and earn an income  (	
 ). When old, they retire and
live og their savings. Old agents are allowed to invest their savings both
at home and abroad. We assume that capital mobility is not perfect. In-
vesting abroad may be costly because of extra informational costs related
to legal issues or because it is more dicult to follow up foreign invest-
ments. Therefore, the cost is higher the higher the total amount of savings
invested abroad. In order to capture these features, we assume that, for
each agent, the overall cost of investing abroad is increasing and convex
in the total amount of savings she is investing abroad.18 This assumption
also captures the empirical observation that portfolios are strongly biased
towards domestic assets.19
Life unfolds according to the following timing. At the beginning of
period  the wage 
 is set. This, combined with the initial capital stock,
determines employment  (	
 ), labour income  (	
 )a n dt h ei n t e r -
est rate  (
). Accordingly, consumption and savings decisions are taken.
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At the beginning of period  + 1, after the wage 
+1 is set, savings are
invested.
Agents maximise the present discounted value of their lifetime utility
and have rational expectations. We assume that the instantaneous utility
function is logarithmic.20 Thus, the problem of a young consumer in the

















 +  =  (7)
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+1 =  [+1 (1 + 










+1,  denote, respectively, consumption when young, savings, con-
sumption when old and labour income at time .21 T h ed o m e s t i ca n d
foreign (net) interest rates are denoted respectively by +1 and 
+1.22
The share of savings invested abroad is denoted by +1.T h e f u n c t i o n
(+1)
22 represents the total cost of investing abroad. We parame-
terise capital mobility with   0, thus encompassing the cases of perfect
capital mobility ( = 0) and no capital mobility ( $ +4). The domestic
and foreign interest rates +1 and 
+1,a n dt h ei n c o m e are taken as
given by individuals. The solution to this problem delivers three regimes.
 In the ﬁrst regime the domestic interest rate is (weakly) larger than
the foreign one, i.e. 
+1  +1. Agents invest all their wealth at
home (+1 = 0). In this case, we get the standard consumption and
savings functions, irresponsive to changes in the interest rate, that
arise with logarithmic utility.
















(1 + +1)( 1 3 )
8In the other regimes, the domestic interest rate is smaller than the
foreign one, and agents invest (part of) their savings abroad.
 If the labour income is high enough, savings are relatively high and
only part of them are invested abroad, because of the convex cost
of moving capital abroad, i.e. 0  +1  1. In this case (do-
mestic and foreign) interest rates do matter for consumption and
savings. In particular, a rise in the domestic interest rate increases
total savings (equation (15) below) because agents invest less abroad
(+1 goes down), incur in smaller transaction costs, and have in-








































































 Finally, in regime  income is relatively low (  ¯ ) and all savings
are invested abroad, i.e. +1 = 1. In this regime the domestic
interest rate does not matter, because the relevant interest rate is
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the foreign one. Formally: if 
+1  +1 and 0    ¯ :
















































In all regimes savings are positive and increasing in income. Moreover,
they converge to
	
2+ both as  goes to zero (full capital mobility) and as
 goes to inﬁnity (Autarchy). The reason is that in both cases, the cost
of investing abroad does not matter. In the ﬁrst case because it is zero; in
the second because no savings are invested abroad.23
The next section solves for the autarchic steady state. In Autarchy
capital is prevented from ﬂowing across borders ( $ +4). In sections
4 and 5, we will move to the case where the cost of investing abroad is
ﬁnite, and will distinguish between the Economic Union (section 4) and
the Political Union (section 5).
3A U T A R C H Y
Subsection 3.1 solves for the economic equilibrium. We then turn to the
politico-economic equilibrium and the politico-economic steady state in sub-
section 3.2.
103.1 Autarchic economic equilibrium
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the autarchic economic equilibrium.











=0, and factor prices {}
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=0, such that, in every period,
1. consumers maximise their lifetime utility (6) subject to (7), (8), (9);
2. ﬁrms maximise proﬁts, i.e. (1) and (2) hold;
3. employment is determined by (1);
4. capital and goods markets clear, i.e. +1 = (
	 ) for all .
In Autarchy, capital does not ﬂow across countries. Hence, consump-
tion when young, savings and consumption when old are as in equations
(11), (12), and (13) and the equilibrium condition +1 = (
	 ) for all





 ) for all  (23)
Given 
, in period  the labour market is in the under- or full-employment
regime depending on the capital stock level. If, at time ,   b  (
)t h e n
full-employment obtains. Viceversa, if   b  (
), the economy is in the



















2+ (1  )


if   b  (
)
if   b  (
)
(24)
S i n c ew ew i l lc o n ﬁne our analysis to steady states in which the regulated
wage will be constant, we analyse the stationary economic equilibrium,
where, given a constant regulated wage 
, the capital stock is constant.
The next lemma describes it.25
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Lemma 1 The stationary economic equilibrium characterises as follows:
1. If the regulated wage is low enough, i.e. 
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Proof. Available at www.econ.upf.es/˜pica or from the author upon re-
quest.
If the competitive wage, evaluated at the stationary capital stock 
and denoted by 
¡
¢
, is larger than the regulated wage, then a full-
employment equilibrium arises.26 P u ti td i gerently, the competitive sta-
tionary capital stock  is large enough to make the regulated wage not
binding and make the labour market clear.
Under-employment occurs if the regulated wage is larger than the full-
employment equilibrium wage. In this case the equilibrium capital stock
depends on the regulated wage in a non monotonic fashion. In particu-









) and decreasing otherwise. The reason is that,
12as emphasised by (4), if the regulated wage is lower than the threshold
(1  ), total labour income is increasing in 
. Hence, savings and
capital are also increasing in the regulated wage.27 Finally, the under-
employment capital stock is increasing in the home production productiv-
ity . The higher , the higher the labour income and savings, and the
higher the capital stock.
Figure 1 depicts the capital accumulation path for a given ﬁxed wage
(solid bold line). At  = b  (
), the under- and full-employment ac-
cumulation paths cross. For   b  (
), the economy is on the under-
employment accumulation path, i.e. the straight line +1 =
	()
2+ ,w h i l e
for   b  (
) is on the full-employment accumulation path, i.e. the
concave curve +1 =
()
2+ . The stationary capital stock of the stan-
dard competitive OLG is .I nt h eﬁgure, the economy converges to the
under-employment equilibrium (
)  .
Let us also mention that the economy might be in a third regime, call
it the home production regime, in which labour income equals .T h i s
regime occurs if and only if  is higher than both the regulated and the






.I n t h i s c a s e ,
 = 
2+ for all . In order to rule out this uninteresting possibility, we
assume that   
¡
¢





We now turn to the determination of the political equilibrium.
3.2 Autarchic politico-economic steady state
The wage rate is determined in the political arena. The key tool to analyse
the political outcome are the value functions of the young and the old,
















	 )=l n (1 +  (
)) (26)
where 	 (
	 ) - the consumption of the young - does not depend on
period  + 1 wage, due to the log utility that makes the ﬁrst period con-
sumption independent of the interest rate.
13
Autarchic Economic Equilibrium






Figure 1: Solid bold line: capital accumulation path, given 
. The under-
and full-employment paths cross at  = b  (
). For   b  (
)t h e
economy is on the under-employment accumulation path. For   b  (
)
the economy is on the full-employment accumulation path. Parameters
values:  = 1
2,  =  = 05,  =  +
()






14We assume that both workers and capitalists are able to intervene in
the political process and agect the political outcome through some kind
of lobbying activities. In particular, we assume that the wage rate 
 is
set by maximizing a political aggregator given by the convex combination
of the lifetime preferences of the young and of the old, with the weights




+1	 )= 	 (
;
+1	 )+( 1 ) 
 (
;)
where  5 [0	1]. The function  (
;
+1	 ) describes the preference
mapping on 
 of the society, given expectations on 
+1 and the capital
stock .
The fully dynamic voting model, however, is not analytically tractable.28
One simple way to make it simpler is to assume that agents choose over
constant policy sequences, i.e. the wage is set once-and-for-all.I nt h i sc a s e ,













ln(1 +  (
)) (27)
where  denotes the given capital stock in place when the wage choice
is to be made.29 This assumption, that allows to get transparent analyti-
cal results, has been used several times in the political economy literature
because of the substantial simpliﬁcation it brings about.30 Its main advan-
tage is that agents do not have to be concerned with the egects of their
vote today on future political decisions.31 This assumption may be justiﬁed
as being an approximation to a world where voting cycles are long. The
drawback is that we have to neglect transitional dynamics (along which
agents’ perceptions that 
 is constant are incorrect) and have to focus on
steady states, where the wage is indeed constant. Notice, however, that
the political outcome would not change if, in steady state, the ballots were
to be (unexpectedly) repeated.
Another viable way to get analytical results is to assume myopic be-
haviour, namely that agents simply do not take into account the egects
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of today’s political decision over the next period wage. This amounts to
assume that agents are atomistic and cannot inﬂuence aggregate variables
(the capital stock). In this case the young behave like a monopoly union
a n dt h e i rp r e f e r r e dw a g ei s 
1 independent of . Under this assumption,
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log(1 +  (
)) (28)
Since under myopic behaviour  (
+1)d o e sn o td e p e n do n
,e x p r e s s i o n s
(27) and (28) are equivalent up to a rescaling of 
0
, meaning that they
deliver the same result up to a rescaling of the political weights. There-
fore, in what follows, we concentrate on the once-and-for-all wage setting
assumption, keeping in mind that the results under myopic behaviour are
qualitatively equivalent. We consequently denote the capital stock in place
at the time where the political decision is made by 0.
The formal deﬁnitions of politico-economic equilibrium and steady
state are as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 For each given level of the capital stock, a politico-economic
equilibrium is a function e 
(0) that maximises the political aggregator
on the set of feasible wages.32 Formally:
e 




In a politico-economic equilibrium capital is taken as given. However,
in steady state, the capital stock depends on the wage rate via economic
equilibrium. Therefore, a wage 
 is a steady state wage only if it generates
a capital stock level ¡

¢





the political aggregator. Formally:










We now turn to the analysis of the conﬂict of interests between old
and young individuals.
163.2.1 The conﬂict of interest between workers and capitalists
Before discussing the outcome of the political process, let us analyse the
preferences of the young and of the old people separately, under the once-
and-for-all wage setting assumption. Let us rewrite the value functions




















;0)=l n 0(1 +  (
)) (30)
where  (
	0)a n d (
) are given by (3) and (5) in the under-employment
regime and by the competitive prices in the full-employment regime. Propo-
sition 1 establishes the conditions under which a conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s te m e r g e s
between the young and the old, i.e. under which the young do want to raise
the wage above the old’s most preferred level.33
Proposition 1 If the economy is dynamically ecient, i.e.   
2++,

















conﬂict of interest between workers and capitalists.
Proof. Available at www.econ.upf.es/˜pica or from the author upon re-
quest.
The intuition is as follows. Old individuals live og their savings. The
higher the interest rate, the happier they are. Given the negative relation
between wages and the interest rate (see equation (5)), capitalists dislike
high wages and support the implementation of the lowest possible wage.
On the contrary, the young may support LMR. The above proposition
tells us that three conditions are needed for this to be true. First,t h e
economy must be dynamically ecient. This implies that the (competitive)
stationary capital stock is lower than the level that maximises aggregate
consumption and the net interest rate is positive.34 In this case, the young
and all future generations are better og if, in each period, 1 unit of resources
is transferred from the old to the young, i.e. the reverse of a social security
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scheme is implemented. The reason is that the market transfers resources
from the second to the ﬁrst period at a rate equal to 1
1+, while the reverse
of the social security scheme provides a rate equal to 1. Thus, if 0, the
latter scheme raises the permanent income of the young and makes them
better og. Absent non-distortionary tools, the young may achieve the same
objectives by using LMR that, de facto, transfers resources over time by
raising the labour income and decreasing the interest rate. However, for
LMR to get support, it must provide better terms than the market. This
may happen only under dynamic eciency (i.e. a positive ).
However, LMR introduces distortions in the labour market. The sec-
ond condition takes care of the size of the production losses, that are
parameterised by .I f is high enough,   , the fall in the aggregate
production is not so high to outweigh the above described gains generated
by LMR.35





This (more technical) condition is required because of the once-and-for-all
wage setting assumption. It makes sure that the potentially chosen wages
are feasible i.e. they stay in place in all future periods.36
Figure 2 depicts the conﬂict of interest. The dashed-dotted line repre-
sents the minimum constant wage implementable in steady state as a func-
tion of 0.37 The old always support the lowest possible wage, and there-
fore their preferred wage is represented precisely by the dashed-dotted line.
The solid line represents the preferred wage of the young 
	 (0	), which
is non decreasing in 0.I f0 is very low, namely lower than 0(), then
the young support the lowest feasible wage.38 As 0 goes up, the elasticity
of income with respect to the wage increases and therefore the beneﬁts of





young agents support a wage larger than the one supported by the old.39
As 0 keeps growing the conﬂi c tm u s te v e n t u a l l yd i s a p p e a r ,b e c a u s et h e
competitive wage goes up and becomes larger than the monopoly union
wage 
1.





	 (0	) shifts down. At  =  the only point contained in
the set is  and 
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Figure 2: Conﬂict of interest.
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3.2.2 Autarchic politico-economic equilibrium
The political aggregator  (
;0) that aggregates the preferences of work-












ln(1 +  (
)) (31)
where  = ln 1+
2+   1
1+ ln(2 + )+( 1 )ln0 does not depend on
the wage.
Figure 3, that depicts e 
(0		) the wage that maximises (31), re-
sembles very much ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgures are obviously equal if the young
are the dictators, i.e.  =1 . A s goes down the interests of the old are





- where binding regulation
takes place - becomes narrower and e 
(0		)s h i f t sd o w n . T h es a m e
happens as  goes down.
3.2.3 The steady state
In steady state the economic equilibrium and the politico-economic equilib-
rium must be mutually consistent. Figure 4 depicts both the economic and
the politico-economic equilibria, i.e. the schedules (
)a n de 
(		).




Proposition 2 If workers have enough political power (()),t h e













,t h e n :
1. The steady state wage 




2. Workers steady state welfare is larger than in the competitive steady
state.
20Autarchic politico-economic equilibrium
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Figure 4: Autarchic steady state.
22Proof. Available at www.econ.upf.es/˜pica or from the author upon re-
quest.
The ﬁrst condition needed for LMR to arise in steady state and raise
the welfare of the young is, quite obviously, that workers have enough
political power. Second, the economy must be dynamically ecient and
third  must be high enough. The intuition is the following.
Under dynamic eciency the labour income share 1   is relatively
low. Thus, the competitive wage is low and young individuals have poor
resources. Savings are low and there is little capital accumulation.40 There-
fore, the stationary capital stock is also low and the returns on capital are
relatively high. In particular, they are higher than zero, the economy
steady state growth rate. It is well-known that, in this case, the wel-
fare of the current and all future young generations is increasing in the
steady state capital stock. Absent other non-distortionary policy tools,
LMR indeed raises the permanent income of the young, their savings and
the steady state capital stock. However, it also generates ineciencies,
due to the labour market distortions that prevent output to be maximised.
The fall in production is decreasing in the home production productivity
. Therefore, if  is not too low the negative egect of labour market
distortions does not outweigh the positive egect of having a higher capital
stock.
All this implies that, under the above speciﬁed conditions, the young
prefers to live in a regulated steady state where the wage is permanently
higher than the competitive level. In such a steady state factor prices are
such that agents are able to achieve a higher steady state welfare, despite
the ineciency generated in the labour market.
4 ECONOMIC UNION: CAPITAL MAR-
KETS INTEGRATION
We now turn to the two-country setting. In this section we assume that
capital markets are integrated, thus capital ﬂows across borders. Each
23
country sets its most preferred wage level. We label this setting as Eco-
nomic Union, (henceforth EU).
Notice that in the open economy setting the capital stock is not a state
variable any longer, since old individuals can choose, at the beginning of
the period, where to invest their savings. Thus,  is not ﬁxed at the
beginning of period , and depends on the interest rates digerential which,
in turn, depends on the wages digerential. Therefore, the state variables
are the (domestic and foreign) asset holdings.
4.1 EU economic equilibrium
As in the previous section, we ﬁrst analyse the economic equilibrium, keep-
ing policy variables ﬁx e d ,a n dt h e nt u r nt ot h ep o l i t i c a ld e t e r m i n a t i o no f
wages and explore the politico-economic steady state.41 The economic
equilibrium deﬁn e sa sf o l l o w s .
Deﬁnition 4 Given the initial levels of the domestic and foreign assets







=0 of domestic and foreign wages,

















=0, domestic and for-





=0 such that, in both countries and in
every period,
1. consumers maximise their lifetime utility (subject to the appropriate
constraints);
2. ﬁrms maximise proﬁts;
3. employment is determined by labour demand;
4. capital and goods markets clear
In each country total investments are now given by the sum of domestic
and foreign investments. Hence, the last condition of the above deﬁnition
24reads as follows:








The next lemma characterises the stationary economic equilibrium as
a function of (constant) 
 and 
.W ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r e
  
,
as the case 
  
 is perfectly symmetric.42









, is increasing in the foreign wage rate. To see why, sup-
pose that countries are in a stationary competitive equilibrium. If they are
symmetric, in equilibrium there are no capital ﬂows. Thus, the competitive
capital stock and wages are equal to the autarchic levels. Suppose now that
in the foreign country a higher regulated wage 
 is implemented. Then in









.43 Let us now characterise the stationary
equilibrium described in lemma 2.
If the regulated wages are suciently high in both countries (case 1 in
lemma 2) under-employment takes place in both countries. Since 
  
,
the level of the domestic capital stock is weakly larger than the autarchic
level, because of the capital inﬂows coming from the foreign country. On
the contrary, the foreign capital stock is lower than in Autarchy, both
because capital ﬂies abroad and because savings decrease (investing abroad
is costly).
If the domestic wage is lower than the domestic competitive level,
while the foreign wage is larger than the domestic competitive level, full-
employment obtains only in the home country (case 2 in lemma 2). The
domestic (foreign) capital stock is higher (lower) than the autarchic level,
because foreigners invest part of their savings in the home country. The
higher the foreign wage, the higher (lower) the domestic (foreign) capital
stock.
Finally, if also the foreign wage is lower than the domestic competi-
tive level, full-employment obtains in both countries (case 3 in lemma 2).
Formally:
25
Lemma 2 In a stationary economic equilibrium, with 
  
, the domes-
tic and foreign capital stocks characterise as follows:






















































1 is the competitive domes-













































. Then, the stationary competitive capital stock
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2 =0
The foreign country stationary equilibrium displays under-employment
if 




























263. Finally, if 
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1, and both countries are in a stationary full-employment
equilibrium:






Proof. Available at www.econ.upf.es/˜pica or from the author upon re-
quest.
We now turn to the politico-economic equilibrium and steady state.
4.2 EU politico-economic steady state
Let the function  (
;0	 
0	
) describe the domestic preferences on the
regulated wage, given the (domestic and foreign) asset holdings, and given
the foreign wage 
. Analogously, let  (
;0	 
0	
)b et h ef o r e i g n
country political aggregator. Let us now introduce some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 5 For each level of the domestic and foreign assets (0	 
0) and
of the foreign wage 
,adomestic politico-economic equilibrium is
af u n c t i o n
(0	 
0	
 ), that maximises the domestic political aggregator











In a politico-economic equilibrium domestic assets, foreign assets and
the foreign wage are taken as given and the wage is chosen so as to maximise
the political aggregator.44 However, in a domestic steady state,d o m e s t i c
and foreign assets holdings depend on the domestic wage rate 
 and on
the foreign wage 







). The same happens abroad. Therefore, a domestic politico-
economic steady state is a mapping of the foreign wage 
 into the domestic
wage, telling the level of the domestic steady state wage for each level of
the foreign wage. This function, denoted by e 
(
), may be understood as
a reaction function.
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Deﬁnition 6 A domestic politico-economic steady state is a func-
tion e 
(


















), the steady state is readily deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 7 A politico-economic steady state is the Nash equilib-

















Having deﬁned the equilibrium concept we turn to the value functions






















 ) is as in equations (12) or (16) and is af-
fected by 




) and the interest rate  (
) are as in equations (3) and (5) if
the economy is in the under-employment regime and equal the competitive
levels if the economy is in the full-employment regime. The value function




 )=l n 0((
	0	
 )(1+(
)) + (1   (
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0 does not agect the individuals that are currently old, since
the current capital stock does not inﬂuence their choices. In the open
economy framework, the old are less harmed by high domestic wages, to
the extent that they can invest abroad.
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We assume that the economy is the range of parameters such that labour
market regulation arises in the autarchic steady state, and analyse what
happens in the open economy framework.
4.2.1 The domestic reaction function
It is interesting to characterise the slope of the domestic reaction function
e 
(




 $ 1, because with no adjustment costs wages must equalise
across countries.47 If  is inﬁnitely high, the rival’s wage simply does
not agect the domestic wage, and therefore e 
(
)
 $ 0. However,
between these two extremes cases, the slope of the reaction function is not
always positive. Indeed, it turns out that there is a big digerence between
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h eh o m ec o u n t r ya t t r a c t sc a p i t a la n dt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
capital ﬂows from the home country.
Figure 5 (panels (a) and (b)), depicts the domestic reaction function,
and the domestic competitive wage as a function of 
. The reaction
function is given by the solid line. The competitive wage is given by the
dashed line. The horizontal line depicts the autarchic wage level (or better,
the autarchic reaction function). Finally, the dotted line is the 45 line.
When the domestic reaction function lies below the 45 line, the home
country is attracting capital because e 
(
) 
 . In this range, the
reaction function is always increasing in 
 (both in panel (a) and (b)).
The intuition is that an increase in 
 m a k e sf o r e i g n e r si n v e s tm o r ei n
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,a n dr a i s e st h ed o m e s t i cc a p i t a ls t o c k .Ah i g h e rc a p i t a l
stock increases the elasticity of the labour income with respect to the wage,
t h u sp r o v i d i n gi n c e n t i v e st ot h ey o u n gt oi n c r e a s et h ew a g ei nt h edomestic
29
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Figure 5: Domestic reaction function: domestic steady state that would
arise for each level of the foreign wage.
30steady state.48 Hence, when the country attracts capital, the foreign and
the domestic wage are strategic complements.
When the domestic reaction function lies above the 45 line, the do-
mestic wage is larger than the foreign one, i.e. e 
(
) 
 ,a n dt h eo l d
in the home country invest abroad. Two mechanisms running in opposite
directions now agect the slope of the reaction function. As 
 goes up,
 (
) goes down, and so does the rate of return on assets that agents
get.49 On the one side, this gives stronger incentives to domestic capital-
ists to lower the domestic wage, so as to raise  (
) and increase the total
returns on assets. On the other side, the rise in 
 increases the amount of
savings invested in the home country from abroad, and makes the domestic
capital stock grow. This raises workers incentives to increase the wage.50
If  is high enough the ﬁrst mechanism prevails. The higher the cost
of investing abroad the more capitalists are harmed by a high domestic
wage, because it is more costly to divert savings to the foreign market.
Hence, when the foreign wage goes up - and  is high - capitalists ﬁercely
struggle for a decrease of the domestic wage. On top of that, when  is
high, a rise in 
 does not increase much the domestic capital stock and
workers incentives to raise the domestic wage. As a result, when  is high




If  is low, by the opposite reasoning, the second mechanism prevails
and e 
(
)i si n c r e a s i n gi n
. Hence, strategic complementarity arises
only if the adjustment cost  is not too high. For instance, this is the case
in ﬁgure 5 panel (a), while the opposite happens in panel (b).51
The comparative statics with respect to ,  and  is straightfor-
ward. The higher  the larger the gains from wage increases, and there-
fore e 
(
;		) shifts up. As  goes up, workers are more powerful,
and again e 
(
;		) shifts up. Finally, as  goes down, the reaction
function rotates, shifting down for low values of 
 a n du pf o rh i g hv a l u e s
of 
 (with the slope approaching unity in the limiting case  $ 0): when
sugering capital outﬂo w s( l o wv a l u e so f
) a smaller  increases the size of
capital outﬂows, and provides incentives to deregulate the labour market.
When enjoying capital inﬂows (high 
’s) a lower  raises capital inﬂows
and, consequently, the level of LMR.
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4.2.2 EU politico-economic steady state: the symmetric case
In this section we analyse the steady state wage policies under the as-
sumption that countries are identical in terms of preferences, technology
and political power of the young and the old. We refer to domestic wage,
b e i n gt h eo u t c o m es y m m e t r i c . W ew i l ld e n o t et h es t e a d ys t a t ew a g e si n
a symmetric equilibrium as 

 (		), the superscript  referring to the
institutional setting (Economic Union) and the subscript  to the fact that
countries are symmetric.














* ~ w w
 w w
* ~
Figure 6: EU symmetric steady state
32The symmetric Nash equilibrium lies at the point where the two reac-
tion functions cross (see ﬁgure 6). This point, as shown in proposition 3,
lies always below the autarchic steady state wage level. As the cost of in-
vesting abroad becomes higher, the wages go up approaching the autarchic
levels. Moreover, the steady state wages are increasing in the home pro-
duction productivity , and in the political power of the young .
The intuition for these results is straightforward. When capital can
ﬂow across borders, LMR is more costly because it reduces the current cap-
ital stock either through larger capital outﬂows or through smaller capital
inﬂows and strategic interaction further decreases the incentives to regu-
late the labour market because each country has incentives to undercut the
rival. Therefore there is less LMR in steady state. Clearly, the lower the
cost of investing abroad, the higher the incentives to deregulate the labour
market and the lower the steady state wage, because of the larger capital
outﬂows that make labour market regulation the more costly. Moreover,
the higher  the more workers’ are willing to regulate the labour market
because of the lower losses incurred when not employed. Finally, the higher
 the more powerful the young and the more regulated the domestic labour
market for each level of the foreign one.
The next proposition characterises the symmetric steady state.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric Economic Union, the (domestic) steady
state wage 





 (		)  
 the equality holding for  $4 . Moreover, it
is increasing in the cost of investing abroad , in the home production
productivity , and in the political power of the young .
Proof. Available at www.econ.upf.es/˜pica or from the author upon re-
quest.
4.2.3 EU politico-economic steady state: asymmetries in 
and 
Let us now suppose that the two countries diger in the home production
productivity .52 For instance, let us assume that   . The equilib-
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rium wages are as follows:53







Moreover, both wages are larger than the steady state wages arising in the















Proof. Available at www.econ.upf.es/˜pica or from the author upon re-
quest.
If   , in the foreign country there is bigger support for regula-
tion, and therefore the foreign reaction function e 
(
)i nﬁgure 6 shifts
rightward. The domestic regulated wage also goes up with respect to the
symmetric case, due to the strategic complementarities arising in the range
where the foreign wage is larger than the domestic one. Thus both wages
go up, the foreign one being larger than the domestic one.54
An analogous proposition may be written in term of ,t h em a i nm e s -
sage being that with   , the political power of the young individuals in
the foreign country is higher, and this shifts the foreign reaction function

() rightward. Thus, again, both the foreign and the domestic wage go
up, with the foreign wage being larger than the domestic one.
5 POLITICAL UNION: INSTITUTIONAL
INTEGRATION
We think of a Political Union as an institutional arrangement in which
policy decisions are centralised and the wage is set at a common level in
34the two countries. We assume that in a Political Union decisions are taken













with the weights reﬂecting the relative inﬂuence of each country inside the
union.
In the symmetric case,  (
;)= (
;), the outcome is triv-
ial, and is given by the (common) autarchic wage. If there are asym-
metries, the wage lies between the autarchic wages of the two countries,
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6 WINNERS AND LOSERS: AUTARCHY
vs. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION
In this section, we perform the following exercise. We suppose that an
i n d i v i d u a lh a st oc h o o s ew h e r et ol i v eh e rw h o l el i f ea n df a c e st h r e ep o s -
sibilities: country A, country B and country C. Country A is a closed
economy. Country B belongs to a Economic Union and country C to a Po-
litical Union. All countries are in steady state and are otherwise identical.
We keep assuming that the conditions of proposition 2 hold and that LMR
arises in the autarchic steady state.
Although this exercise does allow to rank the digerent institutional
settings from the points of view of young and old individuals, it does not
allow to conclude that agents would support shifts from an institutional
setting to another. The reason is that, as we focus on steady states, we do
not take into account costs and beneﬁts that policy changes may trigger
during the transition from one steady state to the other.
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6.1 The symmetric case
The choice between Autarchy and Political Union is straightforward. From
section 5, we know that any agent - young or old - is indigerent between
country A and C, Autarchy and Political Union, because they deliver iden-
tical steady state outcomes. More interesting is the comparison between
Economic Union on the one side, Autarchy and Political Union on the
other side.55
Workers, i.e. young individuals, prefer Autarchy and the Political
Union (country A and C) to the Economic Union (country B). They
are better og in a more regulated environment. The reason, as empha-
sised when characterizing the autarchic steady state (section 3.2.3), is that
labour market regulation allows to raise the ﬁrst period income of agents,
that consequently save more, thus fostering capital accumulation and al-
lowing the economy to reach a steady state with a larger capital stock.
Therefore, under dynamic eciency, LMR raises the steady state welfare
of the young and it is optimal for them to support it. Economic integration,
by lowering the level of LMR, harms the young that are therefore better
og in a Political Union. Notice, however, that in this model the gains from
economic integration are underestimated because of the absence of gains
from trade.
As to the old the result is ambiguous. LMR on the one side reduces
the interest rate, and on the other side raises the capital stock. Thus, the
egect on the second period consumption level is not clear-cut. However,
since we focus on steady states, it does not make much sense to look at
the old agents’ welfare. The relevant agents to look at, in terms of welfare,
are the young. We may stretch this argument even more and interpret
the welfare of the young as welfare tout court under the behind the veil
of ignorance criterion. This well-known and widely used welfare criterion
ranks steady states (and the associate distribution of types in heteroge-
neous agents models) by asking which steady state would an agent choose
before knowing her type. In OLG models heterogeneity is fully driven by
age and the distribution of types is such that the ex-ante probability of
being a worker is 1 and the probability of being a capitalist is zero. This
is why in this model the behind the veil of ignorance welfare criterion coin-
36cides with the point of view of a young person and, consequently, delivers
the conclusion that the Political Union is superior to the Economic Union.
Notice, however, that this result may survive also in a model with a full-
ﬂedged distribution of assets where agents may be capitalists at birth. For
instance, the presence of bequests (with a stochastic component) would
generate a full-ﬂedged asset distribution, and there would be a positive ex-
ante probability of being a capitalist at birth. In this case, the incentives
to regulate the labour market - and the welfare results that follow - would
survive if the steady state wealth distribution is suciently skewed, i.e.
the ex-ante probability of receiving a bequest is low enough.
6.2 The asymmetric case
Now we suppose that countries are asymmetric, and compare the steady
states arising in the three digerent institutional settings, by adopting the
point of view of a young person. In order to perform the same exercise as
before, we assume that there are two sets of countries. A set of “domestic”
countries  where the home production productivity  is high and a set
of “foreign” countries   where  is low, i.e.  .
In each set  (with  = 	 ) there are three countries, A, B and C,
where A is a closed economy, B belongs to a Economic Union and C to a
Political Union. Finally, we suppose that some individuals (domestic guys)
are forced to live in the set , while others (foreign agents) are forced to
live in the set  , and discuss which environment (country A, B or C) would
be chosen by a domestic and a foreign person.
Let us ﬁrst analyse the choice of a young person living in the set
. Being the domestic country more regulated,56 i nt h eE c o n o m i cU n i o n
steady state, both the domestic wage and the capital stock are lower than
in Autarchy. Hence, under the conditions of proposition 2, Autarchy must
be preferred to the Economic Union. Moreover, the welfare level attained
by a young agent in Autarchy is also larger than the welfare achieved in
the Political Union, because the foreign country drives the Political Union
steady state wage down.57 As to the comparison between the Economic
and Political Union, the welfare of a young agent is generally larger in the
37
Political Union. The reason is that the Political Union allows to get rid
both of capital competition (that drives the wage down) and of the capital
outﬂows.58 Thus, Autarchy is preferred to the Political Union, which is
preferred to the Economic Union.
We now turn to the ordering of a young individual, living in the less
regulated set  . If asymmetries among countries are not large, capital in-
ﬂows are not substantial and, by continuity from the symmetric case, both
Autarchy and the Political Union are preferred to the Economic Union, be-
cause they allow to get rid of the negative externality that capital compe-
tition generates on wages. Digerently, if asymmetries are sizeable, capital
inﬂows become considerable. This makes the Economic Union deliver the
highest welfare. Suppose, for instance, that  is so low that no support
ever arises for LMR. Then, the Economic Union delivers a higher steady
state welfare than both Autarchy and the Political Union, because of the
capital inﬂows that increase the competitive wage.59 Even in the extreme
case where the foreign country has the power to unilaterally set the Polit-
ical Union wage ( = 0), the Economic Union would be superior, because
the same policy, the competitive wage, would implemented in both worlds,
but in the Political Union there would not be capital inﬂows.
Also in light of the discussion among European Union countries con-
cerning policy centralisation, it is interesting to summarise the results on
the comparison between Economic and Political Union. Maybe not surpris-
ing, the Political Union is preferred by both the domestic and the foreign
guy only if asymmetries are not sizeable.D i gerently, the foreign guy (less
prone to regulation) is better og in the Economic Union no matter how
large the political power of the foreign country inside the union,w h i l et h e
domestic guy (more prone to regulation) is typically better og in the Po-
litical Union.
7C O N C L U S I O N
In the aftermath of the adoption of the Social Charter by all EEC member
states but the UK, John Major motivated the rejection as follows:
38“Europe can have the Social Charter. We shall have employ-
ment. [...] Let Jacques Delors accuse us of creating a paradise
for foreign investors; I am happy to plead guilty”.60
This paper addresses the issue, illustrated by the above quotation,
of how the incentives to set up labour market regulation are agected by
capital markets integration in a world where countries behave strategically.
In order to do so, we consider a two-country OLG model where the
wage rate is set through a political process in which the young (workers)
and the old (capitalists) may intervene through lobbying activities. In OLG
settings, under dynamic eciency, the young support the implementation
of transfer schemes that redistribute lump-sum from the old. The old are
always against such schemes. If lump-sum transfer are assumed away and
we only allow for LMR, the young are willing to regulate the labour market
if being unemployed is not too costly. In this paper this means that the
productivity of the backyard technology is not too low. Once LMR is imple-
mented, workers save more and accumulate more capital. Then, provided
that workers have sucient political power, LMR endogenously arises in
the autarchic steady state and, under dynamic eciency, raises workers’
welfare, despite the production ineciency generated by the labour market
distortion.
In the symmetric two-country setting with integrated capital markets,
LMR becomes more costly and each country has incentives to undercut the
rival’s regulated wage, in order to attract capital. Hence, in steady state,
wages are lower than in Autarchy. The lower the more capital markets
are integrated. Therefore workers’ welfare (or as we argued welfare tout
court under the behind the veil of ignorance criterion) is larger in Autarchy
than in the Economic Union. As a consequence, a Political Union, where
a common wage level is set for the two countries, also delivers a higher
steady state welfare relative to the Economic Union.
The analysis of the asymmetric case shows that, if asymmetries are
sizeable, the steady state welfare of the country less prone to regulation is
never larger in a Political Union. Digerently, the steady state welfare of the
country more prone to regulation is typically larger in the Political Union.
39
This conclusions may ﬁnd a counterpart in the positions concerning the
debate over policy centralisation at the European Union level of countries
such as France, Germany and (from outside) the UK. However, the model
is stylised enough to suggest not to push it too far.
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44Notes
1I am most grateful to my advisor Jos´ eV .R o d r ´ ıguez Mora for his help and encour-
agement. I am also particularly indebted to Antonio Ciccone for many useful discussions.
I thank Alberto Alesina, Giuseppe Bertola, Federico Cingano, Carlo Devillanova, Chiara
Fumagalli, Jordi Gal´ ı, Adriana Kugler, Albert Marcet, Laura Pagani, Nicola Pavoni,
Roberto Perotti, Jaume Ventura, Hernando Zuleta and participants at seminars at Uni-
versitat Pompeu Fabra, Bank of Italy, European University Institute, University of Ali-
cante, University of Malaga, University of Warwick and University of Southampton for
useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
2The process of European integration, for instance, risked to be mined at the roots in
several circumstances. In June 1992 the Danes voted to reject the Maastricht treaty and
the French came very close to doing so.
3See among others Andersson and Konrad (2002), Bean et al (1998), Beissinger (2001),
Krueger (2002), Rodrik (1997).
4Labour market regulation is, of course, a multi dimensional matter involving a number
of digerent policies, such as employment protection, unemployment beneﬁts, minimum
wages and collective bargaining. All these policies have digerent - well known - egects
on labour market outcomes. However, they do share one common feature, namely they
all contribute to set a ﬂoor to the wage rate. Minimum wages in an obvious way. Un-
employment beneﬁts by raising workers’ reservation wage. Employment protection and
collective bargaining by raising workers’ bargaining power.
5This is typical of OLG models, while it does not happen in inﬁnite-horizon models
where along a balanced growth path the preferences over policies of agents with digerent
asset levels are stable over time (see Bertola (1993)).
6With zero population growth, an economy is dynamically ecient if the (net) marginal
productivity of capital is larger than the economy’s growth rate. Empirically, it seems
that western economies are indeed dynamically ecient (see Abel et al. (1989)).
7Digerent modeling strategies may be adopted to parameterise the size of output losses
due to LMR. See footnote 35.
8Under the empirically plausible condition that the interest elasticity of savings, if
positive, is not too large.
9Notice the digerence between OLG and inﬁnitely lived agents models. In the latter
class of models labour market rigidities reduce the remuneration of capital, thus depressing
investments and the capital stock until wages and the interest rate are restored to the
long-run equilibrium levels. Digerently, in OLG models capital accumulation is taken care
of by the young, whose income source is labour. Hence, the larger the labour income, the
more the young save and the larger the capital stock, provided that savings are poorly
responsive to changes in the interest rate. This is the mechanism through which LMR
fosters capital accumulation. Relatedly, Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) show that shifting
45
the tax burden from the young to the old leads in endogenous growth OLG models to
faster growth. Bertola (1996) extends their results to the perpetual youth OLG model.
10See Saint-Paul (2000).
11See Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999) and Wright (1986) for a political economy
approach. Related papers are Bertola (2002), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Dr` eze and
Gollier (1993) where labour institutions are exogenous.
12Accounting for strategic interaction among countries has proved useful also in analyz-
ing endogenous ﬁscal policies. In a two-country framework, Persson and Tabellini (1992)
ﬁnd that increased capital mobility reduces capital taxation, but the egect is mitigated
by the fact that voters appoint more leftish policy-makers less responsive to strategic
considerations, as a response to lower mobility costs of capital; Perotti (2001) makes the
point that moving from a decentralised to a centralised ﬁscal system may increase the
distortionary egect of redistribution if labour markets are asymmetric and labour is not
mobile; Rodrik and van Ypersele (2001) argue that capital mobility may be politically
not sustainable unless international tax coordination is implemented.
13We are also connected to contributions that explore the egects on labour market
outcomesof the relocation of economic activities, such as Markusen, Morey and Olewiler
(1995), Motta and Thisse (1994), and Cordella and Grilo (1995), and to papers that
analyse the egects of centralised monetary policy on the labour market as Bentolila and
Saint-Paul (2000), Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Saint-Paul and Wasmer (1999).
14The most natural interpretation of this approach is that a minimum wage is imple-
mented. However, other interpretations may also ﬁt this setting. For instance, one may
think of a model where a monopoly union sets the wage, ﬁrms decide the employment
level, and unemployment beneﬁts are determined in the political arena. The higher the un-
employment beneﬁts, the higher workers’ outside option and, consequently, the wage rate.
Alternatively, one may think of policies that ultimately agect wages through workers’ or
unions’ bargaining power.
15Such an alternative technology may also be interpreted as being another sector, per-
haps an informal one, that produces the same good. In a slightly digerent setting,  may
represent the value of leisure.
16 acts as a reservation wage. Hence, it is always the case that   .
17A monopoly union sets a wage that equals the outside option of the worker  times
am a r k u p 1
13,w h e r e is the inverse of the elasticity of the labour demand.
18This assumption may also be justiﬁed on the ground that information costs rise with
the size of the investment, as long as larger investments imply more diversiﬁcation,a n d
therefore the need to gather more information.
19See Lewis (1995).
20This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is low (see Hall (1988)).
21In this subsection we do not make explicit, for brevity, the fact that labour income
and the interest rate depend on the wage.
4622In the following, we will always label foreign variables with a superscript W.
23Hence, savings are ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in  (recall that as  $ 0,
regime  holds, while as  $4 ,r e g i m e holds).
24Notice that labour income (	) and (therefore) savings are both continuous in
.
25For the sake of notational simplicity, in what follows, we make a slight abuse of
notation, and denote ()|= as ¡
¢
.




13 is the stationary capital stock that arises in the standard,
fully competitive, OLG economy.
27Notice that the interest rate does not agect savings because of the logarithmic utility.
However, for the result to go through all is needed is that the interest elasticity of savings,
if positive, is not too high. A CRRA utility function, with a not too high relative risk
aversion coecient would deliver the same result.
28The reason is that agents realise that the current political decision agects the future
choice. Therefore, they have incentives to distort the choice of the current wage  so as
to inﬂuence next generation preferences by agecting the state variable of the economy,
and bias the next period political outcome towards their most preferred level (see Krusell
et al. (1997)).
29Notice that the assumption that the choice is made over a constant wage may be
interpreted as reﬂecting the ability of the society to implement a political mechanism
that excerpt agents’ true preferences on a constant wage rate: when asked about their
preferences, agents reveal the constant wage that maximises their lifetime utility.
30See for instance Bertola (1993), Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999), and Hassler,
Rodr´ ıguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (1999).
31Indeed, strategic voting does not appear to be empirically relevant. Hassler et al
(2003) ﬁnd only limited anecdotal evidence, namely one example in Israel, where it ap-
peared to matter. Moreover, strategic considerations are less relevant the larger is the
time-gap between ballots (see Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999)).
32The feasibility requirement is due to the fact that a constant policy is chosen. A
constant policy e (0) is feasible if indeed it stays in place forever, meaning that, given
0, there will be no future capital stock level such that the wage e (0) is not binding
anymore. Another way of stating it is that in no future period the capital stock is such
that e (0) is lower than the competitive wage.
33Under myopic behavior, a conﬂict of interest between workers and capitalists always
exists. The young behave like a monopoly union and their preferred wage is give by 
13.
The old always prefer the competitive wage.
34More generally the net interest rate is larger than the sum of the population growth
rate and rate of technological progress (both are equal to zero in this paper).
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35An alternative modeling device suitable to parameterise the size of labour market
ineciencies generated by LMR, is to specify a CES production function: the lower the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, the smaller the distortions.
36On the one side, if the capital stock 0 is too low, the preferred wage is lower than
the competitive long-run wage  ¡
¢
. On the other side, as the capital stock becomes
larger, the current competitive wage also grows and becomes eventually larger than the
preferred wage of the young which is bounded from above by the monopoly wage 
13.







 ,t h ee c o n -
omy converges to  if 
  ¡
¢
(see proposition 1). Thus any wage smaller than
 ¡
¢
is not feasible because it will eventually not be binding. If 0   then any
w a g ea b o v et h ec o m p e t i t i v eo n e(0) is feasible (see appendix for details).






, the economy eventually converges to the competitive stationary equilibrium
characterised by the capital stock  and the competitive wage  ¡
¢
(see lemma 1).
Thus, such a low wage may not stay in place forever.
39Note that, when the young support a wage larger than the competitive one, they
always support a wage smaller than the static monopoly wage

13 (that maximises total
labour income). This happens because young take into account (though discounting it)
that a high wage will hurt them in the second period of their lives.
40This happens if the elasticity of savings with respect to the interest rate is low (if
p o s i t i v e )o rn e g a t i v e . O u rl o gu t i l i t ys p e c i ﬁcation, displaying a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to 1, implies that such an elasticity is zero. All the results
go also through with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution smaller than 1.
For evidence of this being empirically plausible see Hall (1988).
41Recall that foreign variables are labeled with an asterisk W and that +1 is the share
of savings invested abroad by domestic capitalists.
42We will not consider the case  =1( a n dW = 1) since in equilibrium it is never the
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is fully characterised in lemma 2.
44As in autarchy, there is a feasibility requirement to satisfy due to the fact that a
constant policy is chosen.
45In what follows we refer to the domestic political aggregator. The description of the
foreign one is analogous.
46Lemma ?? in the appendix analyses the political aggregator.
47In this case, the reaction function is not properly deﬁn e da si nt h ec a s eo fo l i g o p o l y
models with price competition where each ﬁrm best reply is to slightly undercut the rival.
4848Notice that in this regime consumers in the home country do not invest abroad, thus
changes in W do not agect the interest rate they get. Things will be digerent in the
regime e (W)  W.
49Returns on assets are a convex combination of ()a n dW (W), with the (endoge-
nous) weights being (	W)a n d1 (	W).
50Despite knowing from numerical simulations (performed with Mathematica and avail-
able upon request) that the sign of
e 	(	W)
	W is positive for low values of  and negative for




 0f o ra l l¯  (see appendix for details).
51Also  enters the picture. The lower  the smaller the slope of the reaction function
and the more the reaction function shifts downward.
52Asymmetries in the political power of young  qualitatively deliver the same results.
53The subscript  stands for Asymmetric.
54Recall that for levels of W such that domestic regulated wage is smaller than the
foreign one, the domestic reaction function is always increasing in W, while this is not
the case if the domestic reaction function lies above the 45 degree line. Therefore, if
W 
, the foreign reaction function e W () shifts left, and the steady state foreign wage
becomes smaller than the domestic one. It is also smaller than the symmetric SS wage.
However, whether the domestic regulated wage is larger or smaller than the symmetric
SS wage depends on the slope of the domestic reaction function. If the latter is positive
( low), also the domestic regulated wage is smaller than the symmetric SS wage and if it
is negative ( high), the domestic regulated wage is higher than the symmetric SS wage.
55Consistently with the modeling strategy of this paper where the degree openness 
is exogenously given, it may be argued that Autarchy is in most cases not an option
in the real world because national capital markets are irreversibly open and technology
improvements have made the cost of investing abroad low. Therefore, the relevant and
more interesting choice - also in light of the recent debate at the European Union level -
is the one between the Economic and the Political Union.
56Recall that since W 
, in the home country there is stronger support for regulation.
Hence, the domestic steady state wage is higher than the foreign one. This implies that
the foreign interest rate is higher than the domestic one and capital ﬂies from the domestic
to the foreign country.
57Unless the home country has all the political power inside the union (i.e.  =1 ) ,i n
which case the Political Union and Autarchy outcomes are identical.
58However, if asymmetries are large and the political power of the domestic country
inside the Union is very low, a domestic guy may prefer the Economic Union because if
the PU steady state wage is so low that the lack of capital outﬂows does not compensate
for it.
59It is easy to show that when the economy is competitive, capital inﬂows make the
young (and all future generations) better og, and only harm the current old generation.
60Cited in Rodrik (1997).
49